Peterson v. Gentillon Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 38878 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-28-2011
Peterson v. Gentillon Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38878
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Peterson v. Gentillon Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38878" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3679.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3679
IN TIlE SUPREME COURT OF TIlE STATE OF IDAHO 
CRAIG E. PETERSON and JA.~rrCE K. PETERSON, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter -DefendantsfRespondents, 
v. 
"lESLEY J. GENTILLON and CONNIE 
GENTILLON, husband and \\tife; LAMON M. 
GENTILLON and LORI FAYE GENTILLON, 
husband and "wife, 
and 
Defendants/Counterc1aimantslThird-Party 
Plaintiffs! Appellants/Cross-Respondents, 
MARCEL GENTILLON and DORIS GENTILLON, 
husband and wife, 
and 
Third-Party DefendantsfRespondents!Cross-
Appellants, 
SCOTT GENTILLON, 
Third-Party Defendant/Cross-Appellant, 
and 
TRACY GENTILLON, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
APPELLANTS" BRIEF 
Docket # 38878-2011 
Bingham County Case No. 
CV-2007-2306 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Bingham. 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding. 
Dwight E. Baker 
BAKER & HARRIS 
266 West Bridge Street 
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221 
Attorney for The Gentillon Partnership 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE, PA 
PO Box 50271 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for Craig E. and Janice K Peterson 
Hyrum D. Erickson 
RIGBY ANDRUS & MOELLER 
POBox 250 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Attorney for Marcel Gentillon, Doris Gentillon and Scott Gentillon 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. STATEMENT OF TIffi CASE ........................................................................................... 1 
NATURE OF TIffi CASE ....................................................................................... 1 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................ 1 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 3 
ILLUSTRATIVE MAP ........................................................................................................ 4 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................. 12 
ill. ATTOR:N-:EYFEESONAPPEAL ....................................................................................... 13 
IV. ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 13 
A. Whether, the trial court erred in applying the statute oflimitations to bar a vendee's 
claim of specific performance of an executory contract under which the vendee has 
taken and remains in possession with the acquiescence of the vendor? 
.................................................................................................................................. 13 
1. Statute of Limitations ...................................................................... 16 
2. Commencement of the Statute of Limitations ................................ 17 
3. The statute of limitations does not bar the remedy of specific 
performance (execution of deed) when vendee already in possession 
........................................................................................................... 18 
B. Whether, the trial court erred in refusing to award the Partnership the southern strip 
of the homestead extended east to the river? ........................................................ 2l 
C. Whether, the trial court erred in awarding the Petersons the "garden spof!? .......... 27 
D. Whether, the trial court erred in awarding the Petersons an easement for ingress and 
egress of30foot width? ........................................................................................... 28 
E. Whether, the trial court erred in limiting the Partnership's use of its property subject 
to the easement? ...................................................................................................... 30 
F. Whether the trial court erred in awarding costs to the Petersons, based on the 
determination the Petersons were prevailing parties? ............................................ .3 1 
G. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike portions of the cost bill not 
authorized by IRCP 54(d)(I)(C) or (D)? ............................................................. .32 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 35 
-1-
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Abbottv. Nampa School District No. 131, 119 Idaho at 549,808 P.2dat 1294. (1991) ........... .30, 31 
Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. Of1daho, 147 Idaho 67,205 P.3d 1203 (2009) ........................ 22,23 
Barton v. Dunlap, 8 Idaho 82, 92, 66 P. 832 (1901) ........................................................................ 18 
Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57,190 P.3d 876 (2008) ............................................................. 28,31 
Baileyv. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 86 P.3d458 (2004) ................................................................... .34 
Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 14 (1923) ...................................................................... 17 
Bybee v.Isaac, 145 Idaho 251,178 P.3d616 (2008) ................................................................ .22,23 
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704,152 P.3d 575 (2007) ........................ 28 
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex 1\1. And Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955 
(2008) ............................................................................................................................................ 22 
Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 985 P.2d 1127 (1999) ....................................................... .30 
Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 277 P. 542, 545 (1929) ................ .29, 31 
Fordv. Lord, 99 Idaho 580,586 P.2d270 (1978) ............................................................................ 17 
Fullerv. Wolters, 119Idaho415,807P.2d633 (1991) ................................................................. .34 
Harris v. State, Ex Rei. Kempthome, 147 Idaho 401, 210 P.3d 86 (2009) ...................................... 22 
Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738,9 P.3d 1204 (2000) .................. .23, 26 
J. R. Simp/otv. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 167P.3d 748, (2006) .................................................... 23, 25 
Lovev. Watkins, 40 CaL 547,1871 Cal. LEXIS 20 (1871) .............................. 18,19,20.21,22,28 
Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 18 P.3d 956 (2000) ...................................... .26 
Singleton v. Foster, 98 Idaho 149,559 P.2d 765 (1977) ........................................................... 17,18 
Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504, 817 P.2d 170 (1991) ................................................................... .32 
Straub v. Smith 145 Idaho 65,175 P. 3d 754 (2007) ..................................................................... 22 
Thomas v. Thomas, 119 Idaho 709,809 P.2d 1188 (Ct. App. 1991) ............................................. .33 
Village Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 988, 829 P.2d 1335, 1337 
(1992) ......................................................................................................................................... 30,31 
Vincent v. Larson, 1 Idaho 241 (1869) ............................................................................................ 17 
White Bros & Crum Co., Ltd v. Watson, 64 Wash 666, 117P.497,499(1911) ............................. 30 
RULES 
IR.CP 16 ............................................................................................................................................ 34 
IR.CP 54 ............................................................................................................................................ 34 
IR.CP 54(d) or (e) ............................................................................................................................ 13 
IR.CP 54(d)(1) ................................................................................................................................ 33 
-u-
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES (cont.) 
[RCP 54( d)(l )(A) and (B) ............................................................................................................. .31 
[RCP 54(d)(1)(B) ............................................................................................................................ 32 
[RCP 54( d)(l )(C) ................................................................................................................ 2,32,33,34 
[RCP 54(d)(1)(C) or (D) ................................................................................................................ 13 
[RCP 54( d)(l )(D) ................................................................................................................ 2,32,33,34 
[RCP 54( d)( 5) ............................................................................................................................. 32,34 
[RCP 54( d)( 6) .................................................................................................................................. 33 
[RCP 54(e)(3) ................................................................................................................................. 33 
[RCP60 .......................................................................................................................................... 34 
[RCP 60(b)(1) .................................................................................................................................. 33 
[RCP60(b)(3) ................................................................................................................................... 33 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code § 5-216 ..................................................................................................................... 16, 17 
IdahoCode§5-217 ......................................................................................................................... 17 
Idaho Code § 9-503 ..................................................................................................................... 28, 30 
IdahoCode§ 12-120 ......................................................................................................................... 13 
IdahoCode§ 12-121 ......................................................................................................................... 13 
-lU-
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a 1998 written agreement between Marcel Gentillon and his nephews 
Lamon (Mont) and Wes Gentillon, all of whom are married, to exchange some farmland. The parties 
immediately transferred possession of the property to be exchanged, and continued to maintain 
possession until this litigation, but they failed to execute and record deeds. 
In 2006, Marcel and Doris sold a portion of the exchanged land to the Petersons, who 
thereafter filed this action to (1) eject Mont and Wes from the disputed property, (2) enlarge an 
existing easement, and (3) limit the scope of the Partnership's use of the property subject to the 
easement. Mont and Wes claimed the Petersons were on notice as to their competing interest, 
denied the easement should be enlarged, and filed a third party complaint against Marcel seeking 
specific performance of the 1998 agreement, claiming Marcel should be deemed to be holding the 
disputed property in trust for their benefit. 
The court ruled the Petersons were on notice ~rith respect to the interest of Mont and Wes, 
and awarded part of the farmland to Mont and Wes, but granted the remaining property and an 
easement to the Petersons. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The third party purchasers, the Petersons, sued Mont and Wes, and their wives, (hereinafter 
«the Partnership"), the initial vendees, to quiet title to the disputed portion of the land subject to the 
1998 written exchange agreement, and to enforce a 30 foot easement. The Partnership's answer 
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denied the Peterson's status as bona fide purchasers, and sought specific perfonnance in a third party 
complaint against the original vendors, Marcel and Doris GentilIon (the Gentillons) under the 1998 
agreement. In pretrial motions for summary judgment the trial court ruled the Petersons were not 
bona fide purchasers, and the specific perfonnance claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 
The Partnership then filed an amended third party complaint, alleging a resulting trust existed 
v.rith respect to the portion of exchanged land the possession of which had been transferred to the 
Partnership. 
The court agreed in part, imposing a resulting trust on a portion of the previously exchanged 
land, but refusing to do so with the balance. The court further granted the Petersons a 30 foot 
easement for ingress and egress. 
After the trial a supplemental pleading raised a surveymg issue which had been overlooked 
by the parties at the initial trial, based on which the trial court ordered further adjustments to the 
property lines. 
The Petersons then filed a cost bill including claims for survey costs as a matter of right 
under IRCP 54( d)(l )(C) and mediation costs as an extraordinary cost under IRCP 54( d)(l )(D). The 
Partnership failed to timely object to those claimed costs, but thereafter moved the court to deny 
those portions of the cost bill on the court's own motion. The trial court refused to do so. 
Subsequently a contempt citation resulted in a hearing and decision, the result of which was 
to limit the Partnership's right to use the property subject to the easement. 
This appeal followed. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mont and Wes Gentillon are brothers. Their wives are Lori and Connie. They ~i11 be 
collectively referred to as '''the Partnership". Marcel and Doris Gentillon are the uncle and aunt of 
Mont and Wes. They ~ill be referred to as "the Gentillons" or as Marcel and Doris. Their son Scott 
Gentillon and his then wife Tracy are also named as parties. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 118, L. 6 to p. 119, L. 
9, but were divorced prior to the fIling of this action, and neither one is involved in this appeal. 
As will be further developed, the legal analysis at trial and on appeal will focus on six 
separate parcels, which are identifIed as: 
a. The southwest corner of the Gentillon homestead, consisting of.33 acres, the "comer." 
b. The strip of land, approximately 50 feet in width, originally part of the Gentillon 
homestead, south of a surveyor's adjusted boundary lying in Lot 1, Section 24, Range 36 East, 
Township 1 North, the '''fifty foot strip". 
c. The parcel ofland in Lot 1, Section 19, Range 37 East, Township 1 North, immediately 
south of the property line as extended by the surveyor's adjusted boundary,"Lot 1, Section 19, south 
of extended boundary." 
d. Lot 16, Section 24, Range 36 East, Township 1 North, "me Riparian parceL" 
e. The.33 acre parcel west of and adjacent to the homestead, the "'garden spot". 
f. The 30 foot easement created by the 2007 "correction" deed, as contrasted with the 1998 
reservation of a private roadway, the "easement." 
We include on the following page, an illustrative map using Exhibit K as a template for ease 
of reference and understanding. 
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Marcel and his wife operated a fanning/ranching operation for many years, and in the process 
acquired the farm at issue here in 1957. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 8 L 5-7. The fann consists of approximately 
60 contiguous acres, Tr., Vol. 1, p. 120, L 14-25, p. 282, L. 22 to p. 283, L 2. It is located on the 
west bank of the Snake River. See Exhibit K. The legal description is somewhat confusing as the 
fann lies in not only two different sections, but also t\vo different townships. Exhibit K illustrates 
the fann, the majority of which lies in the north half of the northeast quarter of Section 24, Range 
36 East, Township 1 Nort~ Boise Meridian. Because the quarter section involved is a correction 
section, that parcel is identified as Lot 1 of Section 24. The smaller adjoining portion of the fann 
lying to the east, which abuts the Snake River, lies in the Northwest quarter, Northwest quarter of 
Section 19, Range 37 East, Township 1 No~ Boise Meridian. Since that parcel is adjacent to the 
river, it is also designated by Lot number, which is unfortunately also Lot 1, but in Section 19. A 
careful reading of the map will disclose the difference in Lot I of Section 24, Range 36 East, 
Township 1 North as opposed to Lot 1 of Section 19, Range 37 East, Township 1 North, even though 
the properties are not physically divided. There is also a third lot involved, Lot 16 of Section 24, 
which had originally been riparian ground. We will identify those three parcels as "Lot I, Section 
24" and "Lot 1, Section 19," and "Lot 16, Section 24." See Exhibit K or 9. 
In 1991 Marcel and Doris sold the majority of the fann to Scott and Tracy, apparently 
because of the threat of an FHA foreclosure. Tr., Vol. I, p. 8, L 19-21; p. 70, L 24 to p. 71, L 16; 
p. 265, L 10-22. Marcel and Doris retained their homestead, consisting of a home and some 
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outbuildings. Tr, VoL 1, p. 7, L. 14-20; p. 281, L. 2-25. Either the Gentillons or the FHA 
apparently prepared their own survey of the homestead property to be retained, which was a 
rectangular parcel 450 feet by 820 feet located in the northwest comer of Lot 1, Section 24. See 
Exhibit K or 9. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 8, L. 19-21; p. 281, L. 20-25. See Exhibit I. Unfortunately, the legal 
description failed to include the entire home, but rather bisected the home. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 433, L. 
12-17. This fact was not discovered prior to or during the fITst two days of trial in October, 2009; 
when later discovered, a third day of trial fourteen months later in December, 2010, was required. 
The mortgage from Marcel and Doris to the FHA did not include Lot 16, Section 24, (the 
riparian ground), which may have been the reason that parcel was not conveyed to Scott and Tracy 
in 1991 with the rest of the farm. Tr., Voll,p. 8,L.16-21. The riparian parcel identified as Lot 16, 
Section 24, had previously been acquired by Marcel and Doris as the result of an earlier exchange. 
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 17, L. 23 to p. 18, L. 5. 
By December, 1998, Scott and Tracy were delinquent in FHA loan payments, and foreclosure 
was imminent. Tr., VoL 1, p. 174, L. 13-25. Mont and Wes had by that time been farming a 
number of years, and were interested in expanding their operation. Tr., VoL 1, p. 174, L. 13-25. 
Mont and Wes were able to arrange financing through a private source, Idaho Supreme, which 
ultimately led to a family exchange agreement, which was reduced to writing by counsel for Idaho 
Supreme. See Exhibit A. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 54, L. 1-8; p. 174, L. 13-25. 
The principal concern of the Partnership with respect to the purchase was to create an 
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economically feasible farm, which required a modem irrigation circle to replace the handlines by 
which the property had been irrigated. Tr., VoL I, p. 133, L. 1-11. See Exhibit A, Recitals. 
Although Scott and Tracy oWlled the majority of the farm, the parties recognized that if an irrigation 
circle was installed in a fully efficient manner, the circle would infringe upon or cut across the 
southwest comer of the Gentillon homestead. Tr., VoL 1, p. 141, L. 8-21. The parties also 
recognized the need for straight line boundaries, rather than comers, to efficiently farm. T r., VoL I, 
p. 143, L. 21 to p. 144, L. 1. Additionally, Marcel and Doris continued to 0\\;11 the riparian parcel 
(Lot 16, Section 24), which was also necessary for the full revolution of the circle to the southern 
boundary of the property. Tr., VoL 1, p. 139, L. II to p. 140, L. 12. See Exhibits K and P. 
Scott and Tracy reached an agreement to sell their farmland to the Partnership for $200,000; 
however, the Partnership need for an efficient farm also required the exchange of small parcels with 
the Gentillons. 
By 1998, property values for lots overlooking the river were increasing. Marcel and Doris 
agreed to participate in an equal exchange ofland by trading a portion of their homestead in Lot 1, 
Section 24, their riparian ground in Lot 16, Section 24, and a strip of land of a then undetermined 
width off the southern side of their homestead for a portion of Lot 1, Section 19, lying between their 
homestead and the river. See Exhibit A, para 2, p. 2. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 14, L. 3-8; p. 19, L. 6-25. 
However, due to the time of year (December) and the press of the pending foreclosure, the necessary 
survey to identifY modifY the boundaries was not then completed, but by agreement of the parties 
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was deferred. See Exhibit A. That agreement refers to the sale by Scott and Tracy to the Partnership, 
and also sets forth the terms of the exchange between the Gentillons and the Partnership. Tr., VoL 
1, p. 1, L. 7-20. See Exhibit A. 
The written agreement was partially performed. Idaho Supreme advanced the funding, which 
was paid to Scott and Tracy. Tr., VoL I, p. 20-2 L Scott and Tracy deeded all of their interest in Lot 
1, Section 24, to the Partnership, excepting their own homestead in the northwest corner, and the 
Gentillon homestead located in the northeast comer of that Lot. See Exhibits A, K, and 1. Pending 
the completion of the survey and the contemplated exchange between the Gentillons and the 
Partnership, all of the Lot I, Section 19, property o~l1ed by Scott and Tracy was deeded to Marcel 
and Doris. See Exhibit G. 
Darren Leavitt, a relative of the Gentillon family, was engaged to complete the survey, which 
was completed sometime in January, 1999. Tr., VoL I, p. 433, L. 9-10. Darren was charged with 
adjusting the south boundary line of the homestead, extended east across Lot I, Section 19 to the 
river, in order to equalize the property being exchanged between the Gentillons and the Partnership, 
as provided by the Agreement. See Exhibit A. Tr., VoL 1, p. 28, L. 7-18. 
In the process of conducting his survey in January 1999, Darren discovered the Gentillon 
homestead's west property line bisected the home. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 433, L. 12-17. Leavitt testified 
he immediately discussed the encroachment \vith the parties, Te., Vol I, p. 433, L. 18 to p. 434, L. 
16, and the parties agreed the GentiUons would receive an additional parcel on the west edge of the 
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property, referred to as the "garden spot," to resolve the encroachment of the property line through 
the Gentillon's house. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 434, L. 16 to p. 435, L. 6. Darren determined an additional 
.33 acre was required to equalize the property to be exchanged, which he then took into 
consideration in preparing his fInal survey. See Exhibit K. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 435, L. 2-9. Leavitt 
testifIed he adjusted the south property line of the homestead, extended to the river, to equalize the 
acreage. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 437, L. 21 to p. 438, L. 12. A mathematical comparison of the acreages 
involved indicates the Leavitt survey resulted in an approximately equal exchange between the 
Gentillons and the Partnership, as contemplated by the written agreement, (see Exhibit 1), and as 
further modifIed by inclusion of the garden spot in the exchange. See Exhibit K. 
PROPERTY TO BE CONVEYED TO MARCEL 
1. Garden spot 
2. Lot 1, Section 19, north of Leavitt line 
TOTAL 
.33 acres 
2.69 acres 
3.02 ACRES 
PROPERTY TO BE CONVEYED TO THE PARTNERSIDP 
L Lot 16, Section 24, 
2. Portion of southwest corner of homestead 
together with portion of homestead 
South of Leavitt line (see Exhibit B) 
TOTAL 
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L84acres 
1.20 acres 
3.04 ACRES 
Leavitt installed survey stakes consistent with the his \'rTItten survey. See Exhibit K. Tr., 
VoL 1, p. 438, L. 13 to p. 439, L. 8. However, the survey was not recorded, and no deeds were 
prepared or executed to reflect the exchange bet\veen the GentiIlons and the Partnership. Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 203, L. 5-9. Nevertheless, the parties exchanged possession based on Leavitt's adjusted 
boundaries. Tr., VoL 1, p. 144, L. 22 to p. 145, L. 8; p. 153, L. 18 to p. 155, L. 2. The parties 
retained that possession without objection until this litigation began. 
Marcel constructed a fence along the south boundary between the survey stakes, and assumed 
exclusive control of the land north of the newly adjusted south boundary. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 146, L. 3 
to p. 147, L. 14; p. 153, L. 18 to p. 155, L. 2; p. 166, L. 3-16; p. 221, L. 21 to p. 222, L. 18. The 
Partnership rearranged the irrigation mainline along and immediately south of Marcel's newly 
constructed fence. Tr., VoL I, p. 147, L. 24 to p. 148, L. 17. The Partnership assumed exclusive 
possession of all of the property south of the fence, extending east to the river, south to and including 
Lot 16, Section 24, and continuously farmed all ofthat property after 1998. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 131, L. 
24 to p. 132, L. 13; p. 138, L. 3 to p. 145, L. 8; p. 147, L. 7-14. See Exhibit M. By 2003, The 
Partnership was able to afford the contemplated irrigation circle. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 146, L. 3-11. The 
Partnership had it installed, and have farmed the exchanged property as contemplated by the 
agreement since then, including the southwest comer of the original Gentillon homestead and the 
fifty foot strip ofland south of the adjusted line east to the river. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 138, L. 3 to p. 145, 
L. 8; p. 147, L. 7-14. Marcel has continued in possession of the garden spot since 1998. Tr., VoL 
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1, p. 375, L. 25 to p. 376, L. 19. 
This litigation began as the result of the Gentillons' sale to Craig E. and Janice K. Peterson, 
which closed in October, 2006. See Exhibit 2, which is the Deed recorded October 6, 2006, as 
Instrument 572453, records of Bingham County, Idaho. The Petersons did not survey the property 
prior to the purchase. Tr., VoL 1, p. 92, L. 15-25. That sale, and deed, includes some land 
transferred to the Partnership's possession in 1998, pursuant to the exchange agreement (see Exhibit 
A). Specifically, the Peterson deed included the "corner" of the homestead over which the circle 
was to pass, and also those portions of Lot 1, Section 19, south of Leavitt's adjusted south boundary 
line addressed in the 1998 agreement (see Exhibit A) discussed above. 
In 1998, Scott and Tracy had conveyed their entire interest in the farm, the deed for which 
excepted only the ·'road access and easement over an existing private road to the County road." See 
Exhibit I, Tract II. The Gentillons' initial recorded deed to the Petersons (see Exhibit 2, Instrument 
No. 572453) failed to identuy any easement for ingress and egress. Six months later a "Correction 
Deed" was prepared without the Partnership's participation, knowledge or consent, and recorded on 
March 30, 2007, as Instrument No. 579014 (see Exhibit 2). That deed purports to expressly reserve 
a thirty foot easement to the Gentilion homestead over land which the Partnership had originally 
acquired from Scott and Tracy by deed in 1998. See Exhibit 1. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 35, L. 23 to p. 36, L. 
17. There is nothing in the record which establishes any prior reservation of an easement containing 
a metes and bounds description. 
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The entire easement is on the north edge ofthe sprinkler irrigated farm, and consequently was 
sprinkled from time to time, depending on the location of the irrigation equipment and the strength 
of the prevailing southwesterly winds. Additionally, the property south of the mainline within what 
is now a 30 foot easement was farmed, was used from time to time for agricultural purposes, 
including the temporary storage of irrigation equipment, and had been fenced. The Judgment of 
April 10, 2010, increased the size of the easement created by the correction deed to 30 feet, which 
now encompasses the Partnership's mainline and several feet of farmland south of the mainline. R., 
VoL 1, p. 588-589. 
Additionally, the burden of the easement was significantly increased on the servient 
tenement, by preventing continued sprinkling of the property and by prohibiting the Partnership as 
owners of the property either continuing to farm the area south of the mainline or from utilizing the 
property to temporarily store irrigation equipment. R., Vol. 1, p. 681. 
ll. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether, the trial court erred in applying the statute oflirnitations to bar a vendee's 
claim of specific performance of an executory contract under which the vendee has 
taken and remains in possession with the acquiescence of the vendor? 
B. Whether, the trial court erred in refusing to award the Partnership the southern strip 
of the homestead extended east to the river? 
C. Whether, the trial court erred in awarding the Petersons the "'garden spot"? 
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D. Whether, the trial court erred in awarding the Petersons an easement for ingress and 
egress of30 foot width? 
E. Whether, the trial court erred in limiting the Partnership's use of its property subject 
to the easement? 
F. Whether the trial court erred in awarding costs to the Petersons, based on the 
determination the Petersons were prevailing parties? 
G. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike portions of the cost bill not 
authorized by IRCP 54(d)(1)(C) or (D)? 
m. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
No attorney fees were allowed at trial, and no basis exists under Idaho Code § 12-120, 12-
121, or IRCP 54( d) or ( e) for an award of attorneys' fees on appeal. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Whether, the trial court erred in applying the statute of limitations to bar a 
vendee's claim of specific performance of an executory contract nnderwhich the 
vendee has taken and remains in possession with the acquiescence of the 
vendor? 
The underlying facts are virtually undisputed. Exhibit A is a three party agreement executed 
on December 18, 1998, which lays out the obligations and benefits for each of the three parties to 
the agreement. Scott and Tracy Gentillon agreed to and did sell their farm for $200,000. The 
majority of the farm was to go to the Partnership, which paid the $200,000 at the time of execution 
of the agreement. However, the Partnership needed additional property owned by Marcel and Doris 
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Gentillon for installation of an irrigation pivot. Marcel and Doris wanted the ground between their 
homestead and the river. Marcel and Doris agreed to exchange three small parcels for the land they 
wanted. One parcel was the southwest comer of their homestead to allow the rotation of an irrigation 
pivot. A second parcel was a riparian parcel which allowed full rotation of the pivot. The third 
parcel, necessary to equalize the land transfer, was the approximate fifty foot south strip of their 
homestead, which the parties agreed should be a straight east west line to avoid unnecessary comers 
in the farm ground. They agreed a survey was necessary to adjust the boundaries to accomplish the 
intent of the exchange agreement; however, due to a threatened foreclosure and the consequent 
urgency, Scott and Tracy executed deeds for all of their interests in the farm, one for the majority of 
the farm to the Partnership, and a second one to his parents Marcel and Doris for the smaller parcels 
located next to the river, ...vith the anticipation a second round of deeds would be executed by the 
Gentillons and the Partnership when the survey was complete. The agreement did not address any 
modification of the existing easement for ingress and egress. 
Darren Leavitt, a licensed surveyor and relative of the parties, was engaged to perform the 
survey. He did the necessary field work in January 1999, at which time he discovered a significant 
problem apparently unknown to any of the parties. He discovered that Marcel and Doris' home was 
bisected by the western line of the homestead legal description. He therefore contacted the 
Partnership and Marcel and Doris, who orally agreed to correct the obvious error by adding the .33 
acre "garden spot" to the land being acquired by Marcel, in exchange for equal acreage along the 
Page 14 of 36 
adjusted south boundary ofthe homestead. Leavitt prepared his survey accordingly, marking with 
appropriate survey stakes the four locations of the adjusted boundary line for Marcel and Doris' 
homestead. Tr., VoL 1, p.438, L. 13 to p.439, L. 8. See Exhibit K. His survey resulted in an equal 
exchange of property be1:\veen the Partnership and Marcel and Doris, as contemplated by the parties' 
exchange agreement. 
Thereafter, the parties implemented the exchange agreement as orally modified by 
transferring possession of the respective properties, using Leavitt's survey and stakes as their guide. 
A new fence line was constructed by Marcel along the new south boundary of his homestead. An 
irrigation mainline was already in place along the west edge of the "garden spot"; the Partnership 
relocated its mainline across the newly identified southwest comer of what had been the homestead 
to allow the passage of an irrigation pivot, and extended the mainline east to the river, adjacent to 
the fence constructed by Marcel. Marcel and Doris received possession of the garden spot. The 
irrigation pivot was installed in 2003, and the Partnership or its tenants farmed the ground using 
Leavitt's markers as the boundary of the property. However, the parties failed to execute and record 
deeds pursuant to the survey, which led to this litigation. 
In the fall of 2006, Marcel and Doris entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs, the 
Petersons, for the sale of their homestead, as extended to the river. See Exhibit 1; T£., Vol. 1, p. 75, 
L. 21 to p. 76, L. 19. They closed the transaction by paying cash, and receiving a warranty deed. 
The warranty deed disregarded the written and oral exchange agreement between the Gentillons and 
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the Partnership, and instead was based on the then recorded deeds of record, which indicated Marcel 
and Doris still mvned their original homestead, their riparian ground, and the portion of the farm 
received from Scott and Tracy in 1998, but which did not include the "'garden spot" which bisected 
their home. 
Upon discovery of the inconsistency between the deeds and the Partnership's possession, 
the Petersons filed this action to quiet title to the property they had acquired by deed. 
The Partnership denied the Petersons were bona fide purchasers, i.e., purchasers without 
notice of the preexisting of the Partnership's possession and interest in the fannland, which was 
visible from the circle, the mainline, the handlines, the fencing, and the crop land. The Court 
sustained that position in part in its order granting the Partnership summary judgment as against the 
Petersons' claimed bona fide purchaser status. R., VoL 1, p. 283. 
The Partnership's theory was that the court should specifically enforce the written agreement 
as orally modified. Marcel and Doris raised the statute of limitations as a defense, which the court 
also sustained by way of summary judgment on September 30,2009. R., Vol. 1, p. 536. 
In the meantime the Partnership sought leave to file an amended complaint alleging a 
resulting trust theory, which the court allowed in its order of July 31,2009. R., VoL 1, p. 303. 
I. Statute of Limitations 
Idaho Code § 5-216 is quoted as foHows: 
An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing. The limitations prescribed by this section shall 
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never apply to actions in the name or for the benefit of the state and 
shall never be asserted nor interposed as a defense to any action in the 
name or for the benefit of the state although such limitations may 
have become fully operative as a defense prior to the adoption of this 
amendment. 
Idaho Code § 5-217 is quoted as follows: 
An action upon a contract~ obligation or liability not founded upon an 
instrument of writing. 
2. Commencement of the Statute of Limitations 
The underlying issue here is whether the Partnership'S claim for specific performance is 
subject to the applicable statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-216. Idaho has long recognized the 
equitable remedy of specific performance. See Vincent v. Larson, 1 Idaho 241 (1869). However, 
there appear to be few cases in Idaho in which the statutory limitation has been applied to an 
equitable claim for specific performance, and therefore, few if any cases in which an Idaho court has 
determined when a statute oflimitations commences on such claims. See Ford v. Lord, 99 Idaho 
580, 586 Pold 270 (1978); Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 14 (1923). 
In this case the trial court determined the equitable remedy was subject to the statutory 
limitation of action, and further ruled the statute of limitation began to run when the vendee under 
the executory contract, the Partnership, had the right to commence an action, rather than when the 
contract was breached, i.e., when the vendor breached the executory contract by selling a portion of 
the land subject to the contract to a third party. The trial court here relied on Singleton v. Foster, 98 
Idaho 149,559 P.2d 765 (1977) in so ruling. R, VoL 1, p. 536. 
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The Singleton case resulted in a reversal of a trial court's application of the statute of 
limitation to bar a claim for specific performance of a real estate agreement. The Singleton case is 
distinguishable on the facts in that neither the vendee nor the vendee's successor had possession. 
Additionally, the vendee there was apparently in default under the agreement sought to be enforced. 
The ground for the Supreme Court's reversal was based at least in part on the fact that the vendor 
had not provided a notice of default or demand of performance, which the court suggested may have 
been the appropriate date for commencement of running of the statute oflimitations. The summary 
judgment applying the statute of limitations was reversed, and the case remanded. 
We respectfully submit the trial court's reliance on Singleton in this case is misplaced, 
primarily due to the eight years of transferred possession, pursuant to the exchange agreement as 
modified, without intervening objection. The more reasoned approach follows. 
3. The statute of limitations does not bar the remedy of specific 
performance (execution of deed) when vendee already in possession 
In the absence of any Idaho law specifically addressing the issue, we turn to California, and 
the case of Love v. Watkins, 40 CaL 547, 1871 CaL LEXIS 20 (1871). While that case is old, it is 
remarkably similar on the facts, and we submit the law is essentially unchanged in California. The 
case has been cited with approval in Idaho. See Barton v. Dunlap, 8 Idaho 82, 92, 66 P. 832 (1901). 
As noted above, we contend the California common law is persuasive authority with respect to the 
application of the statute of limitations to specific performance claims under these facts. 
The plaintiff Love was the legal owner of the property. She had entered into an executory 
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contract with one Howard to transfer a 10% interest in the property in exchange for services to be 
provided. The services were provided. No deed was executed or delivered. Howard then agreed 
to sell his interest to the defendant Watkins, who took possession of his tract in 1855. Watkins 
remained in possession and made improvements on the property. Plaintiff Love filed an action for 
ejectment in 1865, five years after the running of a five year statute oflimitations. The trial court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that defendant's specific performance defense was time barred. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, placing its logic primarily on the fact of possession. We 
quote a lengthy portion of the decision, which sets forth its logic and result. 
This result is worked out, as I understand it, in this way. It has been 
held that the vendee in an executory contract to convey may maintain 
an action for a specific performance without having demanded a deed, 
and that the Statute of Limitations applies vigore suo to equitable as 
well as to legal causes of action. A cause of action to compel the 
execution of a deed accrued to Howard and Perley as soon as the 
contract was executed, so as to be binding, in 186 I. The right to 
enforce this contract then was barred four years from that date, and 
the defendant's [**30] equity was not a live equity at the time this 
action was commenced. The owner of the equitable title, it is 
supposed, cannot avail himself of [*565] it as a defense to the legal 
title unless he is in a position to demand a conveyance of the legal 
title to him. 
I do not question the correctness of these propositions, so far as they 
affect the rights of the parties arising from the contract relation 
merely, without reference to the fact of possession. I deny the 
proposition, however, that a cause of action has accrued within the 
meaning of the Statute of Limitations, whenever an action may be 
brought in equity. At law a cause of action accrues whenever there is 
an injury for which the law has provided a remedy. This is true, also, 
of a large class of cases arising in equity, principally consisting of 
Page 19 of 36 
those cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction in law and equity. 
But in many cases in equity this is not true, as, for instance, between 
tenants in common. They may at any time bring an action for 
partition; but the fact that five years have elapsed without their having 
done so would be no bar to their right of action. The same is true, I 
apprehend, in regard to a right of action [**31] to quiet title to real 
estate, as in Arrington v. Liscon (34 Cal. 365), the action was 
sustained because the Statute had run against defendant's title, and of 
course against the plaintiff s right to maintain the action, if the Statute 
were applicable to it. Here the party is already in possession of his 
property, and the action is not to recover it or to obtain redress for an 
InJury. 
Upon the execution of a contract to convey, the vendee becomes in 
equity, the m:vner of the land. His estate, however, is subject to be 
defeated ifhe fails to comply with his agreement. After he has fully 
perfonned, he is, in equity, regarded as the absolute owner of an 
indefeasible estate, and the vendor is a naked trustee, having no 
interest, but charged with the simple duty to convey to the vendee 
upon demand. Equity regards the vendee as the owner, upon the 
principle that it considers that as done which ought to be done. Now, 
it seems to me that while counsel recognize the fact that he is, in 
equity, regarded as the owner, they must suppose it to be in some 
different sense from which he is regarded as owner at law, when he 
has [*566] the legal title. But this is not so. He [**32] is supposed, 
for the purposes of Courts of Equity, to have acquired, and to hold the 
title. They will compel the conveyance of the legal title to him, 
because, at law, his equitable title is not recognized. But wherever it 
is recognized it constitutes ownership. Now I cannot understand how 
this estate can be lost by the bar of the statute while the owner is in 
the actual possession and enjoyment of his estate, according to his 
right. 
Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547, 1871 Cal LEXIS 20 (1871). 
We submit the ruling there is the correct ruling here. The GentiHons agreed in writing to 
exchange certain property with the Partnership. See Exhibit A. The agreement was orally modified. 
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Tr., Vol. 1, p. 433, L. 12 to p. 435, L. 6. The contemplated survey was completed, and the property 
lines marked. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 437, L. 25 to p. 439, L. 8. Marcel laid out the south boundary fence 
usingthesurveystakesasaguide. Tr., VoL l,p.146,L.3top.147,L.14;p.153,L.18top.155, 
L. 2; p. 166, L. 3-16; p. 221, L. 21 to p. 222, L. 18. Possession of the property was exchanged in 
1999 as agreed. Marcel retained the garden spot, and the land between his homestead and the river, 
excepting only an approximate 50 foot strip necessary to equalize the property, as agreed. Tr., VoL 
I, p. 153, L. 18 to p. 155, L. 2; p. 166, L. 3-16; p. 218, L. 8 to p. 230, L. 17. The Partnership 
assumed possession of the comer, the riparian strip, and the adjusting strip on the south side of the 
old homestead. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 98, L. 13 to p. 113, L. 9. The Partnership paid $200,000 for the 
property, and subsequently improved the property by installing a circular irrigation pivot. Tr., Vol. 
1, p. 146, L. 3-11. No objections to the exchange of possession were made. Applying the logic of 
the Love decision, supra, the trial court should not have ruled the specific performance claim was 
time barred, but rather should have enforced the agreement of the parties. The effect of the court's 
error was to greatly complicate the relative rights of the parties with respect to each of the parcels, 
which we further address. The appellate court should reverse, and remand with instructions to award 
the Partnership the property which has been in its possession under the exchange agreement since 
1998. 
B. Whether, the trial court erred in refusing to award the Partnership the southern 
strip of the homestead extended east to the river? 
When the trial court by summary judgment barred the specific performance claim, the 
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Partnership sought to amend the complaint, alleging a resulting trust theory. The court allowed the 
amendment. R., VoL 1, p. 297-303. On reflection, the underlying logic was similar to that 
enunciated by the California Supreme Court in Love, supra. 
The trial court determined the scope of the resulting trust in its Findings ofF act, Conclusions 
of Law and Order. R., VoL 1, p. 570-572. 
The court considered the intent of the parties as expressed in the 1998 agreement regarding 
the ··corner," ruling in favor of the Partnership. R., Vol 1, p. 571. The court also considered the 
intent to equalize the farming acreage as expressed the agreement, and concluded equalizing the 
acreage was not "necessary," apparently relying on the deeds, rather than on the terms of the 
agreement and on the possession of the contested parcels by the Partnership, which the court 
recognized. R., Vol. 1, p. 571. 
The purpose of interpreting a contract is to discover the mutual intent of the parties at the 
time the contract was made. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P. 3d 754 (2007); Commercial 
Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M And Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955 (2008); Harris 
v. State, Ex Rei. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 210 P.3d 86 (2009). When interpreting a contract, the 
court must view the entire contract as a whole to discern the parties' intentions. Armstrong v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. O/Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 205 P.3d 1203 (2009); Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 178 
P.3d 616 (2008). When determining the intent of the parties, a court should consider the 
circumstances under which it is made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any 
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construction placed upon it by the contracting parties, as shown by their conduct and dealings. J R. 
Simp/ot v. Rosen, 144 Idaho 611, 167 P 3d 748, (2006). The interpretation of a contract is a question 
oflaw, over which appellate courts exercise full review. Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, 
Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P3d 1204 (2000). 
The agreement, Exhibit A, is titled in part "Agreement for Exchange of Property." The 
recitals in that agreement express an intent to provide for the purchase of the farm, to provide for the 
placement of a center pivot irrigation circle, to provide for an exchange of Marcel' s riparian ground 
for '''part of Scott's Lot 1, Section 19," and to provide for a survey. See Exhibit A, Recitals. The 
body of the agreement provides for a survey, and an adjustment of the south boundary of the 
homestead and the "new south boundary of Lot 1" if the discrepancy of the land exchanged exceeds 
10%. The parties further agreed to in the future "execute documents reasonably required to 
effectuate the terms of the agreement." See Exhibit A. The trial court was required to view the 
contract as a whole to discern the parties' intention. Bybee, supra; Armstrong, supra. The court 
should take into consideration the construction placed on the agreement by the parties. J R. Simp/ot 
Company, supra. 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact determined the Partnership had possession of the farm 
land in question. R., VoL 1, p. 569. The court said, "In this purchase, there is no question whether 
the Petersons were aware that the Partnership occupied and farmed the property in question, or that 
the Partnership had installed a circular irrigation system that ran across the property. Also, the 
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Petersons acknowledge that they were aware of boundary markers and a fence." R, Vol. 1, p. 283. 
In its Conclusions of Law the court re-affirmed its prior summary judgment decision the 
Partnership's possession of the property. R., Vol. 1, p. 569. However, the court declined to award 
the 50 foot strip along the south boundary of the homestead to the Partnership, or the garden spot to 
the Petersons. R., Vol. I, p. 571-572. The trial court determined the "corner" of the homestead 
necessary for the passage of the pivot was subject to the resulting trust, but ruled in its '''Conclusion 
of Law #2-Lot 1" that the balance of the farmland was not subject to the resulting trust, even though 
the court recognized the exclusive possession by the Partnership until the litigation. R, Vol. 1, p. 
571-572. The court also concluded as a matter oflaw the garden spot was to be retained by the 
Partnership, and therefore apparently was not subject to the terms of the resulting trust. R, Vol. 1, 
p. 571. No Findings of Fact appear to have been made with respect to the garden spot in the January 
7, 2010, decision. 
In fairness to the trial court, the evidence offered during the first two days of trial in October, 
2009, with respect to the failure to address the garden spot in the agreement (see Exhibit A) was 
somewhat confused due to the apparent failure of any of the witnesses to recall that the December, 
1998, agreement (see Exhibit A) was negotiated and executed before surveyor Leavitt's belated 
discovery of the bisection of the home by the west line of the homestead in January of 1999. Tr., 
Vol. 1, p. 433, L. 12-17. On January 4, 2010, the trial court ordered a survey to implement its 
decision, as a result of which the "garden spot" encroachment issue was rediscovered. R, Vol. I, 
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page 573. Thereafter, through consent of the parties and after the Petersons' Motion for a status 
conference, the Petersons filed a supplemental or amended complaint on October 2, 2010. R., VoL 
1, p. 602-610. The Partnership entered a general denial. When the trial re-convened on December 
23,2010, Leavitt explained not only his late discovery ofthe garden spot encroachment, Tr., VoL 
1, p. 431, L. 12-17, but also his discussion with the parties who had agreed to exchange property in 
the agreement (the Gentillons and the Partnership). Tr., Vol. 1, p. 433, L. 18 to p. 434, L. 16. He 
testified the parties instructed him to prepare the survey showing the garden spot transferred to the 
Gentillons, and an adjustment ofthe south boundary to equalize the acreage, Tr., Vol. 1, p. 437, L. 
22 to p. 438, L. 15, which he testified resulted in his final survey, equalizing the property exchanged 
taking into consideration the transfer of the garden spot to the Gentillons. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 437, L. 21 
to p. 438, L. 2. As outlined in the Statement of Facts above, the GentilIons and the Partnership 
received approximately equal parcels, 3.02 acres and 3.04 acres, respectively, as a result of the 
exchange required under Exhibit A. Each of the parties took possession of their respective parcels. 
The trial court erred in determining the exchange was "not necessary." R., Vol. 1, p. 571-
572. The court should have taken into consideration the parties' intention as reflected in the 
Agreement to Exchange property (see Exhibit A) as well as the parties' performance of the 
agreement. J. R. Simp/ot Company, supra. The evidence was uncontroverted that: (1) Leavitt 
marked the survey stakes at the four corners involved. See Exhibit 17, which is Exhibit 12 to 
Leavitt's deposition, which was introduced into evidence. Tr., VoLl, p. 236-240; p. 437, L. 25 to 
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p. 439, L. 8. (2) Marcel built a fence line in 2003. Tr., VoL I, p. 146, L. 3-11. Marcel utilized 
Leavitt's two south boundary survey stakes to locate and build his fence along the south boundary, 
extended east to the river. Tr., VoL 1, p. 153, L. 18 to p. 155, L. 2; p. 166, L. 3-16; p. 218, L. 8 to 
p. 230, L. 18. (3) The Partnership laid out its sprinkler mainline immediately adjacent to Marcel's 
fence line. See Exhibitll-I. Tr., VoL 1, p. 98, L. 13 to p. 113, L. 19; p. 147, L. 25 to p. 148, L. 4; 
p. 185, L. 2-12; p. 258, L, 20 to p. 259, L. 8 (4) Marcel assumed exclusive possession of the land 
north ofms adjusted fence line. See Exhibits 11-D, ll-F (foreground), 11-A and 11-E. Tr., Vol. 1, 
p. 98, L. 13 to p. 113, L. 19; Tr., VoL 1, p. 147, L. 11-14. (5) The Partnership assumed exclusive 
possession of the farmland immediately south of the fence line, extended east to the river. See 
Exhibits II-A, ll-C, 11-D, 11-1. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 98, L. 13 to p. 113, L. 19. (6) The Partnership has 
maintained exclusive possession, either directly or through their tenants, of the farmland from 1998 
through the 2011 crop year. See Exhibit 9. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 145, L. 5-8. (7) The property exchanged 
was pursuantto the terms ofthe exchange agreement. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 141, L 2 to p. 145, L 4. (8) 
The Butler survey, (see Exhibit 9), obtained by the Petersons in the spring of 2007, confirmed the 
specific locations of the farm ground retained by the Partnership. See Exhibit 9. T r., Vol. 1, p. 93, 
L 25 to p. 95, L. 9. 
The contract at issue is not ambiguous, and therefore the contract issues present questions 
oflaw which are subject to review by the appellate court. Idaho Potl'er, Co., supra,' Selkirk Seed 
Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 18 P.3d 956 (2000). 
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In its January 7, 2010, decision the trial court applied a resulting trust theory to award the 
"comer" to the Partnership (R., Vol. 1, p. 571); the court refused to apply the trust theory to either 
the adjusted south boundary, or to the garden spot. R., Vol. 1, p. 571. The trial court decision should 
he reversed, or at least modified, to provide the property in the Partnership's possession, as identified 
in Exhibit 9, and as testified about extensively, he awarded to the Partnership. 
C. Whether, the trial court erred in awarding the Petersons the "garden spot"? 
In its January 7, 2010, decision, the trial court refused to award the Petersons the garden 
spot. R., Vol. I, p. 571. The court's logic for its decision is not well explained, but was apparently 
based on a desire to be logically and legally consistent with the court's earlier refusal to award the 
Partnership the southern strip of the homestead. R., Vol. 1, p. 571. However, after the delayed third 
day of trial on December 23,2010, the court reversed its decision with respect to the garden spot 
only, without any logic, factually or legally, for the change of position. The court simply stated, 
'''The garden spot shall be deeded to and title thereto quieted in the Petersons." R., VoL 1, p. 674. 
We contended at the time of the third day of trial, as we do now, that in order to be logically 
consistent, the court should have reconsidered its decision with respect to the fifty foot southern strip 
of the homestead and Lot 1, Section 19, if it was to award the garden spot (with a portion of the 
house) to the Petersons. As the record and decision now stand, there is no articulated or logical basis 
for the court to award the garden spot to Marcel and Doris' successors in interest (the Petersons) 
while refusing to award the southern homestead strip extended across Lot 1, Section 19, to the 
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Partnership. The "'garden spot" was not addressed in the wntten exchange agreement, but was 
addressed in the oral modification of the agreement, which resulted in the exchange of possession. 
We read the trial court's decision to be driven by the Gentillons' (now Petersons') possession of the 
disputed property, which was a concept not taken into consideration with respect to the disputed strip 
on the south of the homestead, extended east to the river. 
We recognize and do not disagree with the practical necessity of the court's decision to avoid 
splitting the home into co-ovvnership. In fact, we encourage that result, but only in the context of 
a consistent application of equitable principles under the appropriate law. The Love decision, cited 
above under Issue I provides that logical basis. Absent an equitable application of a resulting trust 
theory, the Partnership should remain as a co-ovvner of the garden spot, and unfortunately, the house 
\¥ithin the homestead. 
D. Whether, the trial court erred in awarding the Petersons an easement for 
ingress and egress of36 foot width? 
An "easement" is the right to use land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the ovvner. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 
P.3d 876 (2008). An express easement, being an interest in real property, may only be created by 
a written instrument. Idaho Code § 9-503. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 
704, 152 P 3d 575 (2007). Here the easement for the dominant estate, the homestead, was reserved 
when the servient estate, the farm, was sold in 1998. See Exhibit 6, Tract II. The reserved easement 
was defined as a '''road access and easement over an existing private road to the County road." See 
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Exhibit 6. A grant indefinite as to width and location must impose no greater burden than necessary. 
Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 41 Idaho 619, 211 P. 542, 545 (1929). 
The "indrive" reserved for the homestead along the north boundary of the GentilIons' 
property expressly reserved only a "road access and easement over an existing private road to the 
County road" when Scott and Tracy deeded the property to the Partnership in 1998. See Exhibit I. 
We note that the reference to the 30 foot easement reserved in Exhibit I is to the easement across a 
neighbor's property from the canal west to the county road, and not across the Partnership's farm 
east from the canal for the "existing private road" across the Partnership's farm. See Exhibit K. 
The indefinite grant as to width must impose no greater burden on the Partnership than is 
necessary. Coulsen, supra. 
When the Gentillons sold the homestead and adjoining property to the Petersons in 2006, 
by deed recorded October 2, 2006, no reference was made to any easement for ingress and egress. 
See Exhibit 2, for the deed recorded October 2, 2006. The Partnership had and has no complaint 
with respect to the continuation of the previously existing easement for "road access and easement 
over an existing private road to the County" as reserved in the 1998 deed. See Exhibit I. 
However, on March 30,2001, the Petersons and the Gentillons attempted to enlarge the size 
of the easement through a "correction deed" (see Exhibit 2) over real property which had been 
previously deeded to the Partnership. See Exhibit I, Parcel II. We contend there is no factual or 
legal basis by which a unilateral "correction deed" can be utilized to enlarge the size of a previously 
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existing indefinite easement, and thereby enlarge the burden of the servient tenement without the 
express vvritten participation of the owner of the servient tenement. Idaho Code § 9-503. 
Here the court in its judgment of April 14, 2010, created a 30 foot easement across the 
Partnership's farm where no metes and bounds description existed previously. R., Vol. 1, p. 588-89. 
The appellate court should therefore modifY the trial court's order of April 14, 2010, restricting the 
width of the easement to the reservation created in the deed, see Exhibit I, which provides, "road 
access and easement over an existing private road to the County road." 
E. Whether, the trial court erred in limiting the Partnership's use of its property 
subject to the easement? 
The existing road way along the north edge of the property is approximately 20 feet in width 
and is contiguous with the Partnership's farmland on the south. See Exhibit 11 J. After the trial the 
Petersons initiated a contempt citation against the Partnership, complaining about casting water on 
the roadway shown on Exhibit IIJ. Augmented Record, pages 16-17. 
A "secondary easement" is the right to enter and repair and do those things necessary to the 
full enjoyment of the easement existing. White Bros & Crum Co., Ltd v. Watson, 64 Wash 666, 117 
P. 497, 499 (1911), cited with approval in Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 985 P.2d 1127 
(1999). Secondary easements cannot be used to enlarge the burden to the servient estate. Abbott v. 
Nampa School District No. 131, 119 Idaho at 549, 808 P.2d at 1294. (1991). The use of the 
easement may not be enlarged to the injury ofthe servient estate. Village Condominium Ass 'n., Inc. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 988, 829 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1992). 
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The trial court enlarged the burden of the Partnership's servient tenement by restricting 
periodic spraying of irrigation water, as has been the practical result of irrigating their crops in an 
efficient manner for years, and by restricting any other use by the servient tenement. R., VoL 1, p. 
681. Those restrictions are inconsistent with the definition of an easement, Beckstead, supra, and 
with the uses of the easement as declared in Couisen, supra, Abbott, supra and Village 
Condominium, supra. 
The appellate court should modifY the Amended Final Judgment dated February 2200, 2011, 
R. Page 681, or instruct the trial court to modifY the Amended Final Judgment, to remove any 
easement restriction which prevents the Partnership from operating their farm as they have in past, 
provided there is no interference with the Petersons' ingress and egress. 
F. Whether the trial court erred in awarding costs to the Petersons, based on the 
determination the Petersons were prevailing parties? 
Assuming the appellate court reverses or modifies the trial court ruling, the court should also 
determine the Partnership was the prevailing party. An award of costs is controlled by IRCP 54 
(d)(1 )(A) and (B). 
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party 
or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound 
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action 
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prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
The trial court is to consider the '"result of the action in relation to the relief sought in making 
the prevailing party determination." Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504, 817 P.2d 170 (1991). 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the appellate court should reverse the trial court's 
determination the Petersons were the prevailing parties and therefore entitled to recover costs 
pursuant to IRCP 54( d)(1 )(B). \Ve respectfully submit the appellate court should not only reverse 
the trial court's decision, but should also determine the Partnership was the prevailing party and 
entitled to its IRCP 54( d)(1 )(C) costs. 
G. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike portions of the cost bill not 
authorized by IRep 54{d){1){C) and (D)? 
As a result of the trial court's award of costs to the Petersons (R, Vol L, p. 682), the 
Petersons filed a cost bill, claiming attorney fees and surveying costs under IRCP 54( dXl )(C) as a 
matter of right, and mediation fees as a discretionary cost under IRCP 54( d)(1 )(D). R., Vol 1., p. 
698-700. The Memorandum of costs failed to "state that to the best of the party's knowledge and 
belief the items are correct and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule" as required 
by IRCP 54( d)(5). The Memorandum of Costs was, however, accompanied ,\lith an "Affidavit of 
Counsel in Support of Motion for Costs and Fees." R., Vol 1., p. 701-718. The accompanying 
affidavit recited that counsel <'believed the time, work and charges are correct and that all costs and 
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fees claimed are in compliance with !RCP 54(d)(l) and IRCP 54(e)(3)." R., Vol 1., p. 703. 
The Partnership timely objected to the attorney's fee portion of the cost bill. See !RCP 
54(d)(6). R., Vol 1., p. 730-738. The trial court sustained that objection. R., Vol 1., p. 736. 
However, the Partnership failed to object to the survey costs or the mediation expense. The 
Partnership recognizes the failure to timely object is a waiver. See !RCP 54(d)(6). 
The court thereafter entered judgment, including an award of costs, which included both the 
claimed !RCP 54(d)(1)(C) survey costs as well as the IRCP 54(d)(I)(D) mediation costs. R., Vol 
1., p. 776. 
The Partnership then filed a motion requesting the court to modifY the judgment by striking 
both costs, relying upon !RCP 60(b )(3) and the court's inherent power to exercise its own discretion 
in considering a claim for costs. The Partnership did not rely upon the ""excusable neglect" standard 
of !RCP 60(b)(l), since the Partnership's counsel did not feel the neglect was excusable. See 
Thomas v. Thomas, 119 Idaho 709,809 P.2d 1188 (Ct. App. 1991). Instead, the Partnership relied 
upon the "fraud ... or other misconduct of an adverse party" standard provided at !RCP 60(b)(3). The 
trial court refused to exercise its discretion to strike the survey costs and the mediation expense. 
The Petersons have no arguable basis to present by affidavit a claim for survey costs under 
anyone of the ten enumerated provisions for costs as a matter of right under !RCP 54(d)(l)(C). 
Survey costs are not specifically included, and do not fall within any generalized category of costs 
as a matter of right. Counsel could locate no Idaho cases awarding survey costs as a matter of right 
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under IRCP 54. We respectfully suggest neither the Memorandum of Costs nor the accompanying 
Affidavit meet the "correct" or "in compliance with this rule" standards required by IRCP 54( d)(5), 
and therefore are subject to the relief provided by IRCP 60 and the inherent power of the trial court. 
In the event the survey costs can be deemed to fall within the scope ofIRCP 54(d)(I)(C), 
that section limits costs to $500. The survey costs claimed, and allowed, was $4,057.50. R., Vol 
1., p. 699, and R., Vol 1., p. 776. 
With respect to the claim that survey costs in any amount, or in excess of $500, and 
mediation expenses qualifY as an extraordinary cost under IRCP 54(d)(1)(D), we first note the 
Petersons failed to include a "showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party," as 
required by IRCP 54( d)( 1)(D) and the court did not "make express findings as to why such specific 
item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed" as required by IRep 54(d)(1)(D). 
Secondly, we are aware of no Idaho precedent wmch awarded mediation expenses as an 
extraordinary cost. Since the adoption ofIRCP 16, mediations have become some what mandatory 
in many district courts, and are not at all extraordinary. The submission of the cost bill is subject to 
the control of the trial court, and if not properly presented, should be set aside on appeal and 
remanded to the trial court See Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415,807 P.2d 633 (1991). If the trial 
court fails to make express fmdings as to why discretionary costs should be allowed, the costs should 
not be allowed. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 86 P.3d 458 (2004). 
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We recognize the trial courts have broad discretion in awarding costs, and have broad 
discretion in controlling the contents of its orders. We respectfully submit the trial court erred in 
refusing to strike claimed costs which are not presented in compliance with and which are outside 
the scope of costs allowed by our rules of procedure. 
v. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we submit the appellate court should reverse the trial court's decision \\lith 
respect to barring the remedy of specific performance based on the statute of limitations, and should 
direct the trial court to award the Partnership the approximate 50 foot south strip of the homestead, 
together \vith the property south of that line extended east to the Snake River, or alternatively should 
direct the trial court to award the garden spot to the Partnership. The appellate court should further 
order the trial court to amend the order to provide the Petersons \vith an easement for ingress and 
egress of the same nature and scope as reserved in the original deed from Scott and Tracy GentiUon 
to the Partnership in Exhibit I. Lastly, the court should reverse the present award of costs, and 
should award costs at trial and on appeal to the Partnership, or alternatively, strike the award of 
survey costs and mediation costs in favor of the PetersollS. 
>~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this2t day of October, 2011. 
BAKER & HARRIS 
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